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Youth Smoking in the United States
Evidence and Implications
Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan Zinman
One of the most striking trends in the behavior of youths in the United
States during the 1990s has been the increased incidence of smoking. After
steadily declining over the previous ﬁfteen years, youth smoking began to
rise precipitously in 1992. By 1997, smoking by teenagers in the United
States had risen by one-third from its 1991 trough. This trend is particu-
larly striking in the light of the continuing steady decline in adult smoking
in the United States. Indeed, today we are in the alarming position of
having a youth-smoking rate that is roughly 50 percent greater than the
smoking rate of adults.
This striking time trend has motivated substantial public-policy interest
in youth smoking, highlighted by the recent unsuccessful attempt of the
Clinton administration to pass a comprehensive tobacco regulation bill
that had the ostensible main purpose of reducing youth smoking. This
public-policy interest arises out of concern that youths are not appropri-
ately recognizing the long-run implications of their smoking decisions. In-
deed, young smokers clearly underestimate the likelihood that they will
still be smoking in their early twenties and beyond. For example, among
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69high school seniors who smoke, 56 percent say that they will not be smok-
ing ﬁve years later, but only 31 percent of them have in fact quit ﬁve years
hence. Moreover, among those who smoke more than one pack per day,
the smoking rate ﬁve years later among those who stated that they would
not be smoking (74 percent) is actually higher than the smoking rate
among those who stated that they would be smoking (72 percent)
(DHHS 1994).
If youth smoking leads to adult smoking, particularly in a manner that
is underappreciated by the young smokers themselves, it can have drastic
implications for the health of the U.S. population. Smoking-related illness
is the leading preventable cause of death in the United States, and smokers
on average live 6.5 (males) to 5.7 (females) fewer years than those who
never smoked (Cutler et al. 1999). Thus, it is critical to understand the role
that public policy can play in deterring youth smoking.
Yet, despite this interest and concern, we do not very well understand
either the determinants or the implications of youth-smoking behavior.
This paper attempts to remedy these deﬁciencies in our understanding by
providing new evidence on four aspects of youth smoking.
The ﬁrst is the correlation between background characteristics such as
race, sex, education, family structure, and work behavior and the decision
to smoke (or how much to smoke conditional on smoking). We explore
how well smoking behavior can be explained both by clearly exogenous
background characteristics and by potentially endogenous attitudine vari-
ables. And we assess how these relations have changed over time as youth
smoking has risen. Our key ﬁndings here are that background characteris-
tics explain only a small share of the decision to smoke and that smoking
participation is not simply concentrated among the most disadvantaged
youths;indeed,increasinglyovertime,youthsmokingistakingplaceamong
white, suburban youths with college-educated parents and good grades.
The second is an assessment of the extent to which changes in back-
ground characteristics or changes in attitudes toward smoking can explain
the precipitous recent rise in youth smoking. In short, we ﬁnd that neither
plays an important role in explaining this rise; background characteristics
can explain at most 10 percent of it.
The third is an understanding of the role that public policy can play in
deterring youth smoking. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the ef-
fect of prices and other public policies on youth smoking in the 1990s, us-
ing three diﬀerent data sets with information on youth smoking to assess
the robustness of our ﬁndings.
We ﬁnd that the most important policy determinant of youth smoking,
particularly among older teens, is price. There is a statistically signiﬁcant
and quantitatively large response of smoking by older teens to prices in all
three data sets, although the estimated price elasticity varies signiﬁcantly.
On the other hand, price does not appear to be an important determinant
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public policies meant to reduce youth smoking having a robust eﬀect, al-
though there is some suggestion that restrictions on youth purchase of
cigarettes reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked. And we ﬁnd that black
youths and youths with less-educated parents are much more responsive
to price than are white teens and teens with more-educated parents, sug-
gesting a strong correlation between price sensitivity and socioeconomic
status.
The ﬁnal part of this paper then builds on these ﬁndings to assess the
long-run implications of youth smoking and in particular to forecast what
the recent rise in youth smoking bodes for future smoking in the United
States. We do so in two ways. First, we pursue a cohort analysis, examining
what the historical record tells us about the implications of higher rates of
youth smoking for the adult smoking of those same cohorts as they age.
Second, we use the Vital Statistics Natality data to examine the extent
to which policy interventions when individuals are young determine their
smoking decisions later in life. Both approaches yield similar results: there
are signiﬁcant intertemporal linkages between youth smoking and adult
smoking, with each percentage point of additional smoking by youths
translating into only 0.25–0.5 percentage points more smoking by those
youths as adults. This ﬁnding suggests that there will be a signiﬁcant rise in
future adult smoking because of the 1990s experience. Rough calculations
suggest that, even if this rise in youth smoking is transitory (owing to sig-
niﬁcant recent price increases), the adult-smoking rate for this cohort will
rise by 8–16 percent and that at least 1.6 million total life years will be lost
by this cohort.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 provides background on
trends in youth smoking and on previous work in this area. Section 2.2 pre-
sents our cross-sectional analysis of demographic determinants of smoking
decisions and what this analysis implies for explaining time trends. Section
2.3 explores the role of price and other public policies. Section 2.4 then
turns to the intertemporal implications of youth smoking. Section 2.5 con-
cludes.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Youth Smoking: Where It Has Been, Where It Is Going,
and Why We Should Care
The time-series trends in youth smoking are depicted in ﬁgures 2.1 and
2.2. Figure 2.1 shows the trend since the 1970s for the three available sur-
veys of seniors: the Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey, which has sur-
veyed high school seniors since 1976 but eighth and tenth graders only
since 1991; the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS); and the Na-
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are household surveys; from them we use data on older teens.1 There is
considerable uncertainty over the relative value of in-school versus house-
hold surveys for collecting smoking information; the latter have the ad-
vantage of collecting information on dropouts but the disadvantage that
youths may be less willing to give honest answers when their parents may
overhear. Despite these diﬀerences in sources, however, all three surveys
show the same basic trend: large declines over the late 1970s, ﬂattening
and slow declines in the 1980s, and a steep rise in the 1990s.
Figure 2.2 focuses on the trend for the 1990s for all high school youths,
using data from the MTF survey and the Youth Risk Behavior Survey
(YRBS), which collected data for 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997 on a large
sample of ninth to twelfth graders. For both data sets, there are dramatic
increases in the 1990s. In the MTF data, there is an increase of 7.2 percent-
age points, or 35 percent; in the YRBS, the increase starts from a higher
base, but the increase is larger, at 8.7 percentage points, so that the per-
centage increase is also about one-third.
This dramatic upswing in youth smoking is a concern because smoking
as a youth has been strongly correlated with smoking as an adult. Table
2.1 shows tabulations from the 1992 NHIS and the 1995 NHIS on the age
of initiation of smoking by current or former adult smokers. This table
reveals that 42 percent of current or former adult smokers started before
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Fig. 2.1 Smoking participation: Older youths time series
Note: NHSDA data are for persons age 17–19 through 1991 and age 18–20 in 1996–97.
1. In particular, from the NHIS, we use eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds, and, from the
NHSDA, we use seventeen- to nineteen-year-olds through 1991 and eighteen- to twenty-
year-olds for 1996–97.their sixteenth birthday and that 75 percent started before their nineteenth
birthday. Conversely, of those smoking a pack a day as high school seniors
in the MTF survey, 87 percent are smoking ﬁve years later. Even among
those smoking one to ﬁve cigarettes per day, 70 percent are smoking ﬁve
years later.
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 73
Fig. 2.2 Youth-smoking participation in the 1990s
Table 2.1 Percentage of Those Who Ever Smoked Who Began Smoking at
Each Age
%%
Starting Cumulative Starting Cumulative
Age at Age % Age at Age %
6 .47 .47 19 4.47 79.35
7 .79 1.26 20 5.48 84.82
8 1.05 2.31 21 3.21 88.03
9 1.24 3.55 22 1.76 89.79
10 2.67 6.22 23 1.05 90.83
11 1.85 8.08 24 .85 91.68
12 6.50 14.57 25 1.47 93.16
13 6.63 21.21 26 .39 93.54
14 8.81 30.01 27 .42 93.97
15 11.52 41.53 28 .40 94.37
16 13.53 55.06 29 .19 94.56
17 8.73 63.79 30 .98 95.53
18 11.09 74.88
Source: NHIS smoking supplements, 1992 and 1995.If youth smoking is a strong determinant of adult smoking, then the
long-run secular decline in adult smoking may be reversed. Of course,
these facts do not prove that the current upswing in youth smoking will
lead to higher long-run adult-smoking rates, for two reasons. First, it is dif-
ﬁcult to distinguish causality from these intertemporal correlations; smok-
ing later in life may not be a consequence of youth smoking for adults in
the past, but, rather, smoking at both points in life may simply arise from
intertemporal correlation in tastes for this activity. This suggests a natural
test for the causality of this relation between youth smoking and adult
smoking, which is to assess whether exogenous shifts in youth smoking
aﬀect the smoking of those same individuals later in life. This is the exer-
cise that we will take up in section 2.4 below.
Second, however, there may also have been a structural shift in the na-
ture of youth smoking. New young smokers today may be diﬀerent from
new young smokers in the past—in particular, with a greater resolve to
quit—and therefore this intertemporal correlation may be broken. We do
ﬁnd some evidence for this view (which we present below) in that there is
a relative rise in the smoking rates of more advantaged youths in the 1990s.
But these changes are modest relative to the enormous rise in smoking
within virtually every identiﬁable subgroup in our data.
2.1.2 Previous Literature on Youth Smoking
There is a substantial literature on the background characteristics of
youths that are most closely correlated with smoking decisions. This litera-
ture is reviewed in DHHS (1994), which provides a comprehensive over-
view of the state of knowledge to that point. Many of the conclusions in
that chapter are echoed and updated in the discussion presented below as
they draw on the same data that we use.
One interesting additional piece of data that does not come from the
data that we use below is the brand preferences of youths relative to those
of adults. In 1993 (the latest year for which data are available for adults
and teens), smoking among adults was relatively dispersed across many
brands, with the top three brands (Marlboro, 24 percent; Winston, 6.7 per-
cent;Newport,4.8percent)accountingforonly35percentofthetotalciga-
rettes smoked. But smoking among youths was much more concentrated,
with the top three brands (Marlboro, 60 percent; Camel, 13.3 percent;
Newport, 12.7 percent) accounting for 85 percent of cigarettes smoked.
There is also a sizable literature on the responsiveness of youth smoking
to prices and other public policies. The early work on the price elasticity
of youth smoking was cross-sectional in nature. This work generally found
quite strong eﬀects of prices on youth smoking. While there is some varia-
tion, a representative estimate that is frequently cited is Chaloupka and
Grossman’s (1996) estimate of a participation elasticity of 0.675 and a
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Coate, and Grossman (1981) and Lewitt and Coate (1982), although the
result is disputed by Wasserman et al. (1991).
This literature has been strongly criticized, however, by DeCicca, Ken-
kel, Mathios (1998) and Evans and Huang (1998), who point out that, in
cross-sectional data, it is impossible to disentangle price and policy eﬀects
from other underlying long-run determinants of smoking attitudes. For
example, as they note, taxes are traditionally the lowest in the tobacco-
producing states, where smoking is also the highest, and it is diﬃcult to
disentangle causality in that relation. These two papers take diﬀerent ap-
proaches to solving this problem. DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios pursue
a strategy of focusing on smoking initiation, which compares changes in
smoking rates to changes in price within a cohort, and they ﬁnd no signiﬁ-
cant price eﬀect. Evans and Huang, on the other hand, use repeated cross
sections of youths and include state ﬁxed eﬀects to control for ﬁxed-state
tastes toward smoking, and they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant participation price elas-
ticity of 0.5 over the period 1985–92 (using repeated cross sections of
the restricted MTF data discussed below).
Both these approaches have weaknesses. The DeCicca, Kenkel, and Ma-
thios (1998) methodology excludes the responsiveness of quitting to price
increases; ultimately, it is the level of youth smoking that is the concern, not
just initiation. Evans and Huang do consider the overall level of smoking,
but they do not include the other controls for state smoking regulations
that are deemed quite important by DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios. More-
over, neither paper focuses on the period of most interest, the 1990s.
A smaller literature has studied the eﬀect of other antismoking policies
on youth smoking. DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (1998) include in their
model measures of state access restrictions on youth tobacco purchase and
of restrictions on smoking in public places and ﬁnd no eﬀect on smoking.
Chaloupka and Grossman (1996) include a variety of measures of access
restrictions and clean-air regulations; they ﬁnd no (actually wrong-signed)
eﬀects of the former but fairly strong negative eﬀects of the latter in their
cross-sectional study. Another cross-sectional study by Chaloupka and
Pacula (1998) focusing on youth-access-restriction enforcement does ﬁnd
some evidence that more tightly enforced youth-access restrictions lower
youth smoking. But these cross-sectional studies once again suﬀer from
the fact that the legislation and enforcement of youth-access restrictions
may be correlated with ﬁxed underlying attitudes toward smoking. Two
interesting case studies of communities that implemented tough youth-
access restrictions found mixed results, with Jason et al. (1991) ﬁnding
substantial (50 percent) declines in youth smoking in Woodridge, Illinois,
and Rigotti et al. (1997) ﬁnding very limited eﬀects on sales to youths and
on youth smoking in several Massachusetts communities.
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somewhat mixed conclusions, particularly the limited literature that has
attempted to control for unobserved state characteristics. Moreover, an-
other limitation of most of the work on price responsiveness is that it has
focused on either only one cohort or only one age group of teens. In fact,
as we document at length below, there is considerable heterogeneity among
the teen population in terms of responsiveness to policy variables.
2.2 Determinants of Youth Smoking
2.2.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
For this part of the analysis, we will be using the public-use data set
from the Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey, a large, nationally repre-
sentative cross section of high school seniors. This survey contains infor-
mation on a rich set of background characteristics and attitudine variables,
making it an excellent source for trying to model the determinants of youth
smoking comprehensively. These public-use data do have two drawbacks,
however. First, they are only for high school seniors, which means that
we cannot explore how these background characteristics aﬀect smoking
decisions by younger teens. Second, they do not contain very detailed loca-
tion information, which means that we cannot explore the role of state-
level policies. We address both these issues in our policy analysis below.
We use data from the MTF surveys over the period 1976–97.
We will estimate simple cross-sectional models of smoking, using two
diﬀerent dependent variables: a dummy for smoking participation (deﬁned
as smoking any cigarettes over the previous month) and the number of
cigarettes smoked conditional on smoking at all. For the former, we will
estimate linear-probability models for ease of coeﬃcient interpretation;
our results are very similar if we use probit or logit models instead. For
the latter, the results are somewhat diﬃcult to interpret since factors that
aﬀect the participation decision can have composition eﬀects on the condi-
tional number of cigarettes smoked.
2.2.2 Cross-Sectional Results for 1997
We begin by estimating cross-sectional models for 1997, the last year in
our sample. We include a broad set of variables in our base speciﬁcation
that are plausibly exogenous to the smoking decision. Our basic results
for 1997 are presented in tables 2.2 (participation) and 2.3 (conditional in-
tensity). There are a number of ﬁndings of interest: The single most impor-
tant determinant of smoking is race: blacks and those of “unknown race”
(likely other nonwhites) smoke much less. Those living with fewer than
two parents are more likely to smoke. Males are less likely to smoke (but
smoke more when they do smoke); in the raw data, males are more likely
76 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan ZinmanTable 2.2 1997 MTF Public-Use Regression Results: Participation
Covariate Coeﬀ. Covariate Coeﬀ.
SMSA .0276 Age 	 18 .0126
(.0102) (.00746)
Number of siblings .0015 GPA (normalized by regional .265
(.00403) annual average) (.0197)
Race (1  black) .30 Married (omitted  .0368
(.0118) unmarried (.0274)
Race unknown (captures .141 Engaged (omitted  .0689
Latino etc.  no response) (.00891) unmarried (.016)
Parents 	 2 (omitted  two- .0209 Separated/divorced (omitted .045
parent household) (.00862)  unmarried) (.0414)
Sex (1  male) .0122 College-prep program .0233
(.00769) (omitted  general high (.0091)
Grew up in rural area .0357 school program)
(omitted  ‘grew up (.0139) Vocational-prep program .0269
mostly in suburbs’) (omitted  general high (.014)
Grew up in a town .0178 school program)
(omitted  grew up mostly (.0116) No plan to attend college .0741
in suburbs) (omitted  plan to attend (.0142)
Grew up in city (omitted  .0307 college)
grew up mostly in suburbs) (.0109) Probably will not attend .0418
Father’s education 	 high .0082 college (omitted  plan to (.0139)
school (omitted  high (.0133) attend college)
school education) Probably will attend college .0175
Mother’s education 	 high .0318 (omitted  plan to attend (.0101)
school (omitted  high (.0136) college)
education) Mom worked (omitted  .00753
Father has some college .0076 mom never worked when (.0101)
(omitted  high school (.0117) growing up)
education Works (1  yes, 0  no) .0177
Mother has some college .0232 (.0124)
(omitted  high school (.011) Job hours per week .00224
education) (.000559)
Father college graduate .0248 $/week from job .000458
(omitted  high school (.0108) (.000109)
education) $/week from other sources .000665
Mother college graduate .0373 (.000131)
(omitted  high school (.0103) Religion important .00545
education) (.00451)
Northeast region (omitted .0134 Attend religious services .000242
 Midwest region) (.0108) regularly (.00439)
South region (omitted  .0263 Days missed school .0161
Midwest region) (.0099) (.001)
West region (omitted  .0546 N 15,525
Midwest region) (.0127)
Adjusted R2 .1125
Note: Regressions estimated using 1997 cross section of MTF data by linear-probability model; mean of
dependent variable is 0.353. Standard errors are given in parentheses. SMSA  standard metropolitan
statistical area.Table 2.3 1997 MTF Public-Use Regression Results: Conditional Intensity
Covariate Coeﬀ. Covariate Coeﬀ.
SMSA .143 Age 	 18 .318
(.303) (.234)
Number of siblings .0114 GPA (normalized by regional 4.35
(.127) annual average) (.595)
Race (1  black) 5.61 Married (omitted  1.55
(.492) unmarried (.944)
Race unknown (captures 2.57 Engaged (omitted  1.55
Latino etc.  no response) (.33) unmarried (.443)
Parents 	 2 (omitted  two- 1.1 Separated/divorced (omitted 5.29
parent household) (.265)  unmarried) (1.19)
Sex (1  male) .867 College-prep program 1.02
(.244) (omitted  general high (.285)
Grew up in rural area .394 school program)
(omitted  ‘grew up (.418) Vocational-prep program .915
mostly in suburbs’) (omitted  general high (.409)
Grew up in a town .761 school program)
(omitted  grew up mostly (.359) No plan to attend college 1.77
in suburbs) (omitted  plan to attend (.419)
Grew up in city (omitted  .994 college)
grew up mostly in suburbs) (.341) Probably will not attend .776
Father’s education 	 high .569 college (omitted  plan to (.416)
school (omitted  high (.417) attend college)
school education) Probably will attend college .279
Mother’s education 	 high .059 (omitted  plan to attend (.321)
school (omitted  high (.441) college)
education) Mom worked (omitted  .0113
Father has some college .312 mom never worked when (.321)
(omitted  high school (.367) growing up)
education Works (1  yes, 0  no) 2.2
Mother has some college .25 (.419)
(omitted  high school (.342) Job hours per week .0837
education) (.0177)
Father college graduate .188 $/week from job .0135
(omitted  high school (.334) (.00347)
education) $/week from other sources .0209
Mother college graduate .042 (.00394)
(omitted  high school (.321) Religion important .2
education) (.142)
Northeast region (omitted .205 Attend religious services .419
 Midwest region) (.322) regularly (.138)
South region (omitted  1.06 Days missed school .187
Midwest region) (.312) (.028)
West region (omitted  2.48 N 5,450
Midwest region) (.405)
Adjusted R2 .139
Note: Regressions estimated using 1997 cross section of MTF data by linear-probability model; mean of
dependent variable is 7.329. Standard errors are given in parentheses. SMSA  standard metropolitan
statistical area.to smoke, but this appears to be reversed by the inclusion of variables such
as work status and family structure. Those living in suburbs (the omitted
location group) are likely to smoke more. Those with more highly educated
parents are more likely to smoke, with no clear pattern for the intensity of
smoking. There are lower smoking rates in the West. Academic perfor-
mance and trajectory appear to be very signiﬁcant. Current GPA (relative
to year/region normalization) has huge signiﬁcant eﬀects (with better stu-
dents smoking less), and students in college-preparatory programs and
those planning on attending college smoke signiﬁcantly less across the
board. Those who are married are less likely to smoke, but those who
are engaged or divorced/separated are more likely to smoke. Those who
work are less likely to smoke, but smoking rises quite strongly with hours
worked and with income. Those who are absent from school more fre-
quently are more likely to smoke. Overall, the model has modest explana-
tory power, with an R2 of 0.11, which is fairly high for a linear-probability
model.
The key ﬁndings of these regressions are that smoking is not as purely
concentrated in disadvantaged youths as it is concentrated in low-
socioeconomic-status adults: smoking is much lower among minorities
than among whites; it is more likely in the suburbs than in either the city
or rural areas; and it is positively correlated with parents’ education. On
the other hand, youth smoking is much more likely among those with
worse academic performance, those who miss more school, and those who
do not plan to go to college. There also appear to be strong income eﬀects
on smoking: more hours worked and more income lead to more smoking
among high school seniors. An interesting question is whether the positive
association with indicators of advantage such as suburban dwelling or col-
lege-educated parents are also picking up unmeasured aspects of income.
2.2.3 Can We Explain the Time Series?
In trying to explain the dramatic increase in smoking in the 1990s, the
ﬁrst step is to assess whether there were changes in background character-
istics that might play an important role. We do this by taking our cross-
sectional models and using the estimated relations to predict smoking in
each year, given the values of the X’s in each year. If changes in back-
ground characteristics are explaining the time-series pattern, then this pre-
dicted series should mimic actual smoking behavior.
We present the results from doing so in ﬁgure 2.3. We use here a cross-
sectional model estimated in 1985–86 to predict smoking in each year so
that we can do out of sample predictions on both the steep decline in the
1970sand thesteep increasein the1990s;we cometo theissue ofcoeﬃcient
stability next. In fact, we ﬁnd that this model can predict very little of
either the decline in the 1970s or the rise in the 1990s. The predicted series
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 79does rise very slightly in the 1990s, by 0.7 percentage points, but this is less
than 10 percent of the 7.8 percentage point rise in smoking by high school
seniors over this period. Thus, the steep increase in smoking participation
of the 1990s is not explained by changes in background characteristics.
Figure 2.4 shows the same exercise for smoking intensity. Here, the
model predicts somewhat better the changes over time, but this is perhaps
not surprising since the changes are much more modest.
2.2.4 Changes in the Estimated Relations
One issue of importance is whether it is very inappropriate to apply
constant coeﬃcients to the estimated relations between smoking and back-
ground characteristics because the relations are changing over time. This
is a particularly interesting question owing to our inability to ﬁnd the ex-
pected negative relation between socioeconomic status and smoking in the
recent cross section. Is this because over the 1990s smoking has become
more of a “yuppie phenomenon”?
We investigate this by examining the changes in the coeﬃcients in our
cross-sectional model over time. Table 2.4 shows changes in these coeﬃ-
cients for smoking participation, ﬁrst from 1976 to 1986, then from 1986
to 1997. The second column shows the coeﬃcients for 1976, the third col-
umn for 1986, and the fourth column for 1997; the ﬁfth column shows the
change from 1976 to 1986 (the 1986 coeﬃcient minus the 1976 coeﬃcient)
and a t-statistic on that diﬀerence; the next column does the same for
1986–97; and the ﬁnal column does the same for the entire period 1976–97.
The results show substantial stability in the characteristics of smokers
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Fig. 2.3 Smoking participation: predicted vs. actual
Note: p-values were generated using 1985–86 coeﬃcients.over this twenty-one-year period; only eleven of the thirty-ﬁve coeﬃcients
change signiﬁcantly. But there is a striking and consistent story from the
coeﬃcients that do change: smoking is rising much more among “advan-
taged” youths, particularly in the 1990s. There is a signiﬁcant rise in smok-
ing among whites relative to nonwhites, among those students who do not
work relative to those students who do, among those students who live in
suburban settings relative to those who live in town or urban settings,
among those whose mothers are college educated relative to those whose
mothers are not, and among religious students. Perhaps the most striking
pattern is the association of high relative GPA and smoking: while smoking
fell signiﬁcantly for high-GPA students relative to low-GPA students be-
tween 1976 and 1986, it then rose even more over the next decade for the
high-GPA strata.
Thus, smoking is indeed rising signiﬁcantly among advantaged youths
relative to their disadvantaged counterparts. But it is worth noting that
these relative changes are completely swamped by the secular increases
among all groups. To conﬁrm this point, in ﬁgure 2.5 we graph smoking
rates over time for four comparison groups: men and women; whites and
blacks; suburban and urban dwellers; and high- (top 25 percent) and low-
(bottom 25 percent) GPA students. For every group, smoking rates rise
precipitously in the 1990s; the only group for which this rise appears mod-
est is low-GPA students. Thus, we conclude that, while there was a shift
toward more smoking by advantaged students over the past ten to twenty
years, that shift was swamped in the past decade by other factors that are
aﬀecting all students.
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Fig. 2.4 Smoking intensity: predicted vs. actual


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Fig. 2.5 Smoking participation by subgroup: A, gender; B, race; C, urban vs.




D2.2.5 Adding Attitude Variables
The MTF data have a variety of other attitude variables that may poten-
tially be correlated with smoking decisions but are also potentially endoge-
nous to the same external factors that are causing smoking to increase.
While we have excluded these variables from our basic model, given the
failure of changes in background characteristics to explain the time trend
in smoking participation, it is of interest to know whether changes in atti-
tudes can explain this trend. We have therefore augmented our basic mod-
els by including the host of attitude variables that may be relevant for
smoking decisions: Do you disapprove of those who smoke one or more
packs per day? How often do you see antismoking ads? Does smoking
make a guy/girl your age look cool, insecure, independent, conforming,
mature, or trying to look mature and sophisticated? Do you prefer to date
a nonsmoker? Has the harm from smoking been exaggerated? Does smok-
ing reﬂect bad judgment? Do you mind being around others who smoke?
Is smoking a dirty habit? How much of a physical risk does smoking pose?
How severe are the consequences of smoking for students in your school?
The full set of these variables is available only since 1989, so, for this
exercise, we focus on the period from 1989 to 1997. Over this period, some-
what surprisingly, there do not appear to be any clear trends in attitude
variables. There is a slight rise in the share of teens exposed to counterad-
vertising in 1996–97, although this variable has no eﬀe c to ns m o k i n gd e c i -
sions in our cross-sectional models.
Perhaps reﬂecting this lack of trends, adding these variables to our
model does not improve its predictive performance. Indeed, as ﬁgure 2.6
shows, the model with attitude variables actually predicts declining smok-
ing in 1996 and 1997, when smoking continues to rise. So changing atti-
tudes, at least as reported in the MTF survey, do not appear to explain
the rise in smoking in the 1990s either.
2.2.6 The Role of Other Substances
One interesting question is what role other risky behaviors, and in par-
ticular, the use of other substances, are playing in this time-series pattern.
We explore this issue in ﬁgure 2.7, which shows, along with smoking partic-
ipation, the use of alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs; in each case, par-
ticipation is deﬁned as any use over the past thirty days, analogously to
smoking. In fact, in all three cases, the time trend looks very much like
that for smoking, with declines until 1991 and increases thereafter. The
correspondence is particularly striking for marijuana, although use drops
oﬀ some in 1997.
Interpreting these correlated trends is diﬃcult as there are at least three
possibilities. The least likely is that there have been exogenous shifts in the
use of these other substances that have led to increased smoking; although
86 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan Zinmanthere is no statistically convincing evidence, most work on pathways of
substance use suggests that smoking is a pathway to the use of other sub-
stances, not the reverse. A second possibility is, therefore, the reverse: that
the rise in smoking in the 1990s led to more use of these other substances.
We present evidence below that falling cigarette prices in the 1990s can
explain 30 percent or more of the trend in smoking by highschool seniors
over this time period. And there are a number of studies that suggest that
smoking is complementary with the use of these other substances (Cha-
loupka et al. 1998; Dee 1999). Thus, at least part of these trends in other
substances may have been driven by falling cigarette prices.
But it seems unlikely that this can explain all these strong trends, partic-
ularly for marijuana. A third alternative is, therefore, that there were other
shifts in tastes that led to greater use of all these substances. One piece of
suggestive evidence for this view is the lack of correspondence between the
time trends in the use of cigarettes and the use of these other substances
in the 1980s: the use of other substances fell much more than did smoking.
These trends cast some doubt on either of the two alternatives suggested
above and favor instead a shift in taste toward all substance use in the
1990s.
2.3 Prices and Other Public Policies
Given the failure of background characteristics to explain the trend in
youth smoking in the 1990s, a particularly important question is whether
price movements can explain this upsurge. In fact, as ﬁgure 2.8 documents,
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Fig. 2.6 Predicted vs. actual participation with attitude variables
Note: p-values were generated using 1989–90 coeﬃcients.there was a substantial decline in prices in the early 1990s, corresponding
precisely to the timing of the increase in youth smoking. Of course, youth
smoking continued to increase even after prices began to rise again, but
the most precipitous increases in youth smoking were over the period
1992–94, when prices were falling. Moreover, recently released data for
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C1998 reveal both a sharp increase in prices (by 10 percent) and the ﬁrst
decline in youth smoking of the decade, as smoking among high school
seniors fell by 1.4 percentage points (3.8 percent). So the question natu-
rally arises, Can price movements explain the time-series trend?
This ties into a more general question of the role that public policy can
play in determining youth-smoking behavior. A primary determinant of
price movements for cigarettes is excise-tax policy. Moreover, there are a
variety of other policy tools that state and federal policy makers can pur-
sue in an attempt to reduce youth smoking. Are these successful, and what
do they suggest for future policy directions? We address these questions
below.
2.3.1 Data
The public-use data from the MTF survey are not suitable for this exer-
cise because they do not contain information on state of residence and
they are not available for teens other than high school seniors. We therefore
searched for data sets that had available data on smoking for repeated
cross sections of teens of all ages over the 1990s as well as state identiﬁers
so that cigarette prices and taxes could be matched to the youths. Three
data sources meet this criterion, and all three are used.2 The ﬁrst, and best,
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Fig. 2.8 Smoking participation vs. cigarette price
2. A fourth data set that could have been used here is the National Household Survey of
Drug Abuse (NHSDA), but this was excluded for two reasons. First, the quality of these
data before the mid-1990s is quite suspect owing to the use of in-home surveys without
computer assistance that could suﬀer from bias owing to observation by parents; indeed,
these data do not appear to show an increase in smoking among teens through the mid-
1990s, while the more respected MTF and YRBS surveys both do. Second, there is no public-
use or even private-use version of the NHSDA data available with state identiﬁers; only
selected researchers can access these data.source for our purposes is a restricted-use sample of the MTF data that
includes information on smoking behavior, race, age, sex, and state of resi-
dence for eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders, from 1991 through 1997. We
focus on 1991 as the starting point for the analysis for three reasons: this
is the last year before teen smoking began to rise; this is the year in which
the eighth- and tenth-grade MTF data become available; and this is the
year in which the YRBS data (described next) became available.
The second data source is the YRBS data graphed earlier. These data
provide information on smoking and a limited set of background charac-
teristics for 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997 for a sample of ninth to twelfth
graders. The MTF and YRBS data are comparable in that they provide
nationally representative, in-school surveys of youths. As noted earlier
with reference to ﬁgure 2.2 above, they suggest diﬀerent levels of smoking
among teens but similar trends. The sample sizes of these surveys are also
comparable. But the MTF data have the strong advantage of being a more
complete survey over this sample period; the survey includes data on
thirty-ﬁve states in every year from 1991 to 1997 and a total of 277 state-
year pairs over this time period. On the other hand, the YRBS is a survey
that is phasing into coverage of the entire nation, with only ten states in
the survey in every year and only 102 state-year pairs over this time pe-
riod.3 As a result, while from 1991 to 1997 there are ﬁfty-nine tax changes
to be studied in the MTF data, there are only fourteen in the YRBS data.
Thus, the results that we obtain with the MTF data are more robust to
the speciﬁcation check pursued below, and we will rely on them as our
primary estimates.
The third data source is the Vital Statistics Natality detail ﬁles. These
data are a census of birth certiﬁcates for the United States, with approxi-
mately 4 million observations per year. The data contain information,
since 1989, on the smoking behavior of the mother during pregnancy, and
they are available for virtually every state in every year from 1991 on,
providing even more variation than the MTF survey (seventy-three tax
changes over this time period).4 But these have the disadvantage of being
focused solely on one particularly select group of teens, those having chil-
dren before their nineteenth birthday. Owing to the enormous size of the
Natality database (over 300,000 teen mothers per year for our seven years
of analysis), we do not analyze micro data on smoking rates by mothers.
Rather, we group these data into state  year  age cells and analyze
cell mean rates of smoking and conditional smoking intensity where the
regressions are weighted by cell size.
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3. All our YRBS means and estimates are weighted using weights designed to reproduce
national representativeness.
4. Smoking data are not available for California, Indiana, and South Dakota for any year
and for New York for 1991–93; smoking data for New York City, but not the remainder of
the state, are available beginning in 1994.The means for all three data sets are presented in table 2.5. We consider
two measures of smoking: participation, deﬁned as any smoking over the
past month, and conditional intensity.5 The latter measure has the diﬃculty
as a dependent variable that, if there are policy eﬀects on participation,
there could be sample-selection bias to the eﬀects on conditional intensity;
for example, if higher prices reduce smoking participation and those who
quit are low-intensity smokers, then higher prices could be associated with
higher intensity among those who remain smokers through this com-
position eﬀect.
As noted above, smoking rates are somewhat higher in the YRBS than
in the MTF data sets; for high school seniors over this time period, partic-
ipation rates are 31 percent in the MTF and 36 percent in the YRBS.
Smoking rates are much lower for teen mothers; for seventeen- to eighteen-
5. In the MTF and YRBS data, conditional intensity is measured in intervals, and we
use the midpoint of each interval for intensity. In the Natality data, the intensity question
is continuous.
Table 2.5 Means of MTF, YRBS, and Natality Price-Regression Samples
Cigarettes/ Real
Any Day When Real Excise
Smoking Smoking Price Tax
MTF Data, 1991–97:
12th grade (N  91,567) .309 7.21 1.39 .21
(.462) (8.87) (.17) (.10)
8th–10th grade (N  213,527) .217 5.42 1.38 .21
(.412) (8.38) (.17) (.10)
8th–12th grade (N  336,665) .246 6.13 1.39 .21
(.431) (8.63) (.17) (.10)
YRBS data, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997:
12th grade (N  14,346) .358 6.06 1.28 .21
(.479) (6.13) (.15) (.10)
9th–11th grade (N  38,932) .315 5.15 1.28 .21
(.464) (5.70) (.15) (.10)
9th–12th grade (N  53,278) .326 5.42 1.28 .21
(.469) (5.85) (.15) (.10)
Natality data, 1991–97:
17–18 years old (N  666) .180 10.23 1.23 .19
(.075) (1.31) (.14) (.10)
13–16 years old (N  1,319) .127 9.21 1.22 .19
(.071) (1.70) (.14) (.10)
13–18 years old (N  1,985) .164 9.93 1.22 .19
(.078) (1.51) (.14) (.10)
Note: Authors’ tabulations of MTF, YRBS, and Natality data. All prices and taxes in 1982
dollars. Micro data for MTF and YRBS; cell-level data for Natality, as described in the text,
with means weighted by cell count. “Cigarettes per day when smoking” is cigarettes per day
smoked on days when smoking. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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smoking intensity for high school seniors is higher in the MTF survey,
averaging 7.2 cigarettes per day, compared to 6.1 cigarettes per day in the
YRBS. Intensity is even higher for teen mothers, averaging over 10 ciga-
rettes per day for seventeen- to eighteen-year-old mothers. Thus, smoking
among teen mothers appears less frequent but more intense when these
women are participating. Note that this is not just a male/female diﬀer-
ence; smoking participation among males and females is very similar in
the YRBS and MTF surveys, and intensity is actually somewhat higher
for males.
Smoking is less frequent, and smoking intensity lower, for younger teens
in all three surveys. In the MTF and YRBS surveys, the full sample results
are weighted more closely to the results for younger teens since the samples
of younger teens are much larger; in the Natality data, they are weighted
toward older teens since there are so many more births to older teens in
the data.
The key independent variables to be used in the analysis are state-level
measures of prices, taxes, and other policies. Prices as of November of
each year for each state are provided in Tobacco Institute (1998), and a
monthly series can be constructed from information on taxes given in that
volume as well. The MTF and YRBS surveys are both conducted in the
spring, so we use an average of the prices from November of year t  1a n d
November of year t as our price measure and the tax rate as of February as
our tax measure. For the Natality data, we know the actual month of the
birth, so we use the tax rate from that month of birth.
The two dimensions of antismoking policy that we explore are clean-air
regulations and youth-access restrictions. Clean-air regulations, which are
described in substantial detail in Jacobson and Wasserman (1997), are
laws that restrict smoking in certain public areas. We constructed a com-
prehensive database of such laws using information from the state legisla-
tive records, Coalition on Smoking OR Health (various years), and the
Centers for Disease Control website (http://www2.cdc.gov/nccdphp/osh/
state/). While there are a large number of such laws, we categorize them
into ﬁve categories: restrictions on private workplaces, public (e.g., state
and local government) workplaces, restaurants, schools, and other public
places (e.g., elevators, public transportation, theaters).
Youth-access restrictions are laws designed to limit youth purchases of
tobacco products since, while youth smoking is legal, selling cigarettes to
youths is not. As reviewed in Jacobson and Wasserman (1997), states have
therefore endeavored to implement barriers to youth access to cigarette
purchase along various dimensions. Categorizing these state eﬀorts is
diﬃcult as there are a large number of diﬀerent regulatory tools, and states
enforce them with varying degrees of rigor. We therefore rely on the expert
opinion of a panel convened by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to
92 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan Zinmanevaluate state laws limiting youth access to cigarettes (Alciati et al. 1998).
This panel reviewed a wide variety of state laws in this area and formed an
index to capture their overall “bite” in limiting youth access. Its members
considered nine categories of state regulation and provided a score within
each, which is aggregated into a total index. Their index is available for
1993–96; we have followed their rules, in consultation with them, to use
state laws to extend the data back to 1991 and forward to 1997. We did
augment their index by adding some ﬁner disaggregation of categories and
by correcting some inconsistencies with actual legislation. We also added
three additional categories that they did not consider: advertising restric-
tions; licensing of retailers; and penalties on minors themselves for to-
bacco purchase. The index also reﬂects state eﬀorts to comply with the
recent Synar amendments proposed by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration.
We describe in more detail how this index was created in the appendix.
Appendix table 2A.1 also shows means for the MTF data of the clean-air
and youth-access-index variable. The average value of our access index
is roughly 12 (where the maximum possible value is 26); about half of
students were subject to restrictions on smoking in private workplaces,
whereas restrictions in restaurants, government work sites, schools, and
other sites were more common.
The other frequently discussed public-policy intervention meant to re-
duce youth smoking is counteradvertising. While this is a major focus of
very recent discussions, over the time period studied in this paper (ending
in 1997) there was very little counteradvertising in most states.6
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
For all three data sets, we pursue a similar estimation strategy, consider-
ing the eﬀect of prices and public policies on smoking in the following
regression framework:
(1) SMOK PRICE ACCESS CLNAIR ijt jt jt jt




  ε ,
where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, t indexes years, SMOK is a
measure of smoking (participation or conditional intensity), PRICE is the
price per pack of cigarettes (inclusive of taxation), ACCESS is the index
of access restrictions, CLNAIR is a set of dummy variables for clean-air
regulations, X is a set of individual control variables (which varies by data
set), S is a set of state dummies, and T is a set of year dummies.
6. Based on conversations with experts at the Oﬃce on Smoking and Health at the Centers
for Disease Control. The available data suggest that only a few states had major programs
in place by 1997 and that the spending on those programs was fairly constant over our
time period.
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 93By including a complete set of state ﬁxed eﬀects, this regression sur-
mounts any problems with ﬁxed diﬀerences across states in both the level
of prices and the propensity to smoke, for example, owing to tobacco-
production intensity. However, two potential concerns remain with the in-
terpretation of the price coeﬃcient in this speciﬁcation. First, if tobacco
companies are doing any state-speciﬁc pricing, then prices may be endoge-
nous to smoking levels. While 80 percent of the variation in prices within
states over time is driven by tax changes (Gruber and Koszegi 2000), there
remains 20 percent that is possibly demand driven. We therefore instru-
ment prices with the tax rate in the state to provide identiﬁcation solely
from tax-induced price movements. All estimates presented below are
from such instrumental-variables models.
Second, the identifying assumption of this estimator is that within-state
changes in taxation (and other public policies) are not themselves deter-
mined by youth-smoking behavior. It is plausible that tax policy is set as
a function of smoking in a state, with revenue-maximizing legislators and
an inelastically demanded good. Since youths smoke only about 2 percent
of the total number of cigarette packs smoked annually, it is doubtful that
youth smoking per se is driving tax policy. But it is possible that youth
smoking is correlated with some of the same factors that drive adult smok-
ing and possibly therefore with tax setting. With this short panel it is
diﬃcult to address this concern deﬁnitively, but we discuss an attempt to
do so below.
Another important estimation issue is that we are using a large number
of observations in each of these data sets but really have variation in our
key variables only across state and year cells. As a result, all regressions
are estimated with the standard errors corrected for within-state-year-cell
correlations in the error terms.
2.3.3 Results—MTF Data
We begin the analysis by focusing on the MTF data, the MTF being, as
discussed above, the highest-quality source of nationally representative
data. We also start with high school seniors, to parallel most previous work
in this area.
The results of estimating equation (1) for high school seniors are pre-
sented in the ﬁrst two columns of table 2.6. The most important ﬁnding is
that there is a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of prices on smok-
ing participation. The implied elasticity at the sample mean is 0.67. The
eﬀect on conditional intensity is negative but insigniﬁcant, implying a
small elasticity of conditional intensity of 0.06. As noted earlier, it is dif-
ﬁcult to interpret these estimates as the pool of smokers is changing. In par-
ticular, it seems likely that those who quit smoking as the price rises have
the lowest ex ante intensity, which would lead to a positive composition
bias to the estimates.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yWe obtain much less convincing evidence for the role of other policies,
however. There is a negative eﬀect of access restrictions on the quantity of
cigarettes smoked, but the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. The only clean-air
restrictions for which there are signiﬁcant negative eﬀects are for restric-
tions on government workplaces (in terms of conditional quantity smoked)
and for restrictions on other sites (for both participation and quantity
smoked). It seems highly unlikely that there is a true causal eﬀect of re-
strictions in government work sites on youths; it is perhaps more plausible
that restrictions on other sites, such as public transportation, might matter.
Does this signiﬁcant price eﬀect suggest that we can explain the time-
series movements by the price decline of the early 1990s? From 1991
through 1997, the price of cigarettes fell by fourteen cents. At our esti-
mated coeﬃcient on participation, this explains 26 percent of the 8 per-
centage point rise in smoking for high school seniors over this time period.
Thus, price is playing an important role but not the dominant one.
The next four columns of table 2.6 investigate the eﬀect of prices and
policies on younger smokers (eighth and tenth graders). Interestingly, there
is little eﬀect of price on the smoking of younger teens. The coeﬃcients on
both participation and intensity are insigniﬁcant for eighth to tenth grad-
ers and, as a result, for the full sample of eighth to twelfth graders. Over
the full sample, the price elasticity for participation is only 0.31, with a
conditional-intensity elasticity of 0.03. This casts further doubt on the
role of price as the primary determinant of the time-series trend since the
trends in smoking are quite similar for eighth to tenth graders and for high
school seniors. On the other hand, even though younger smokers are less
price sensitive, their estimated price sensitivity is still nontrivial; it is simi-
lar, for example, to the elasticity of smoking participation estimated for
adults by Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999).
The eﬀects of other policies on the smoking of eighth to tenth graders
are more interesting than are their eﬀects on the smoking of high school
seniors. We now estimate a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of youth-access restric-
tions on the conditional quantity of cigarettes consumed by younger teens,
which is not subject to selection bias owing to the insigniﬁcant eﬀects on
participation. This coeﬃcient suggests that moving from the lowest to the
highest value of this index would lower smoking intensity by 1.38 cigarettes
per day, or 25 percent. This is interesting because it is indeed possible that,
by raising the hassle costs of obtaining cigarettes, access restrictions do
not deter youths from smoking at all but rather limit the extent to which
they do smoke. We also again obtain negative eﬀects of government-work-
site restrictions on smoking intensity and negative eﬀects of other clean-
air restrictions on both intensity and participation.
There is a paucity of control variables available in these restricted MTF
data. We do ﬁnd that smoking rises with grade. The age variables are de-
ﬁned only conditional on grade (owing to restrictions in the MTF data),
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 97but they have the expected pattern: older children within each grade smoke
more. Nonwhite youths are much less likely to smoke, and there is a posi-
tive eﬀect of being male among high school seniors but a negative eﬀect
among eighth and tenth graders, with the result that, for the full sample,
the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. As we showed above, the positive eﬀect for high
school seniors of being male becomes negative when other covariates avail-
able in the public-use data are included.
2.3.4 YRBS and Natality Data
As emphasized above, a key advantage of our analytic strategy is that
we have brought several data sets to bear on this question in order to
analyze the most consistent patterns of eﬀects of public policy on smoking.
In this spirit, tables 2.7 and 2.8 replicate the results for the MTF data in
the YRBS and Natality data, once again for older teens (seniors in the
YRBS, seventeen- to eighteen-year-olds in the Natality data), younger
teens (ninth to eleventh graders in the YRBS, thirteen- to sixteen-year-
olds in the Natality data), and overall.
The most strikingly consistent ﬁnding across all three data sets is the
negative eﬀect of prices on smoking by older teens. In the YRBS, the elas-
ticities are enormous: there is an elasticity of 1.5 on participation and
an elasticity of 1.5 on conditional intensity. In the Natality data, the
elasticities are more modest, with an elasticity of participation of 0.38
and an elasticity of conditional intensity of 0.15. It is perhaps not sur-
prising that the elasticity is smaller for teen mothers than for other groups
given that the very fact that these women are smoking reveals their insensi-
tivity to information about the hazards posed by smoking to newborns.
This smaller elasticity is not due to the gender composition of the sample.
In both the MTF and the YRBS data, we estimate very similar elasticities
for males and females; the elasticities are somewhat higher for males in
the MTF and somewhat higher for females in the YRBS.
Moreover, there is a consistent ﬁnding of a much smaller eﬀect of prices
on young smokers. In the YRBS data, the elasticity of participation is
wrong signed, and the elasticity of conditional intensity insigniﬁcant, for
ninth to eleventh graders. In the Natality data, both coeﬃcients are right
signed but insigniﬁcant.
Why might we be ﬁnding that older teens are more price sensitive? There
are several possible explanations. One is that smoking means diﬀerent
things at diﬀerent ages. Younger teens may view participation as pure ex-
perimentation, which is less well described by economists’ models of ad-
dictive behavior (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1988) and which is as a result
less sensitive to such economic factors as price. But, by the time these
youths have become high school seniors, they have completed their experi-
mentation phase, and smoking follows expected relations with price and
other economic factors. This type of story is consistent with the fact that




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yyounger teens who smoke consume a smaller quantity of cigarettes and
with the evidence (presented below) that the demographic correlates of
socioeconomic disadvantage (race and parents’ education) lead to higher
price sensitivity for high school seniors but not for younger teens.
Alternatively, younger teens may be pursuing smoking in order to be
accepted by a peer group, and, by the time they are high school seniors,
they have been accepted into the group. If smoking as a younger teen
regardless of price is required to gain acceptance to a peer group but, once
within the group, peer eﬀects have their usual multiplier eﬀect on price
elasticities, then this would yield low price elasticities on younger teens
and higher ones on older teens. Finally, it may simply be that teens using
their own money are more price elastic than are those who rely on money
from parents (obtained either complicitly or illicitly).
In contrast to the robust and signiﬁcant eﬀect of prices on youth smok-
ing, however, we obtain much more mixed evidence on a role for other
public policies. There is no public-policy variable other than price that is
signiﬁcant for either age group in all three data sets or even in both the
data sets representing the full teen population (the MTF and the YRBS).
The most robust ﬁnding appears to be for the eﬀect of youth-access restric-
tions on the quantity of cigarettes smoked, which is negative for both
younger teens and high school seniors and signiﬁcant for the latter in the
Natality data; the magnitudes of the eﬀects for teen mothers are much
smaller than for all teens in the MTF. We also ﬁnd negative eﬀects of
clean-air regulations for restaurants (which are signiﬁcant for participation
by high school seniors in the Natality and YRBS data) and of clean-air
regulations for other sites such as public transportation (which are highly
signiﬁcant in the MTF and are negative and marginally signiﬁcant for
younger teen participation in the Natality data).
The coeﬃcients on the covariates in the YRBS generally conform to
expectations. There is little eﬀect of sex and an enormous negative eﬀect
of race on smoking rates. Smoking rates fall with grade (conditional on
age) but rise strongly with age so that, on average, smoking is rising with
grade as well. Echoing the ﬁndings presented above using MTF micro
data, there is little eﬀect of parents’ education on smoking, at least for high
school seniors; there is some evidence that having more-educated parents
leads to less smoking for eighth and tenth graders.7 There are very few
covariates in the Natality data, but they do conﬁrm that smoking rises
with age and is much higher among whites.8 One interesting diﬀerence be-
tween the Natality and the YRBS data sets is that smoking among Hispan-
7. Parents’ education is not available in the 1991 YRBS and is missing for a number of
respondents in other years, so the omitted category here is either parents who are high school
dropouts or parents for whom education is missing.
8. Note that the covariates here are cell means, e.g., percentage white in the age-year-
state cell.
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 103ics is much lower in the Natality data but is only marginally lower in the
YRBS. Unfortunately, owing to the restricted nature of the MTF data, we
cannot bring that evidence to bear on racial distinctions; the data report
only whether the youth is white or nonwhite.
In summary, there are four conclusions to be drawn from these basic
results. First, there is a sizable and signiﬁcant negative eﬀe c to fp r i c eo n
smoking by high school seniors, particularly for the decision to participate.
This ﬁnding is robust to all three data sets. We estimate elasticities that
range from 0.38 (Natality) to 1.5 (YRBS), but the most reliable esti-
mate is probably the elasticity of 0.66 from the MTF data. Second, how-
ever, we ﬁnd that there is no eﬀect of price on younger teens so that, in the
aggregate, the price eﬀects on teen smoking are weak, with overall price
elasticities for teens ranging from 0.13 (YRBS) to 0.35 (Natality).
Third, there is some suggestion that laws that restrict youth access to to-
bacco products reduce the intensity of youth smoking but not smoking
participation. Finally, there is little consistent evidence that clean-air re-
strictions matter for youth-smoking decisions.
We have also considered speciﬁcation tests to address two potential con-
cerns about this exercise. The ﬁrst is that, for two of our three data sets,
we have data only on students, not on high school dropouts. This may
lead to a biased estimate of the aggregate teen elasticity if dropouts are
diﬀerentially price sensitive, but, since the quoted statistics on teen smok-
ing come from the in-school surveys used here, these are the relevant data
for trying to explain time trends. More perniciously, however, if high
school dropout rates are somehow correlated with tobacco taxation, then
there could be a sample-selection bias to our estimates. We have included
in the regressions reported here data on dropout rates by state and year.
In no case did including these control variables much change our coeﬃ-
cient on price, nor did the variables themselves enter signiﬁcantly in our
regressions. So this suggests no bias from selection on who remains in
school as taxes change.
Another more serious concern, mentioned earlier, is that excise taxes
may be endogenous, if not directly to youth smoking, then to aggregate
cigarette consumption, which may in turn be correlated with youth-
smoking decisions (either positively, through adult and peer eﬀects, or neg-
atively, through teen contrariness). This general endogeneity concern is
impossible to address perfectly, in particular given the very short panel of
data with which we are working. One approach to addressing the speciﬁc
concern that our ﬁnding is driven by an omitted correlation of youth and
adult smoking is to include directly in the regression a control for aggre-
gate cigarette consumption in that state in the previous year. Once again,
the results are very robust (with the exception of a decline in the partici-
pation elasticity estimate to 1.2 in the YRBS data), and the coeﬃcients
on lagged packs per capita themselves are generally insigniﬁcant. Thus, it
104 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan Zinmanappears that correlations between aggregate consumption and both tax
setting and youth smoking cannot explain our ﬁndings.
2.3.5 Heterogeneity
The analysis thus far has considered youth smoking as a simple aggre-
gate and has not explored the heterogeneity in policy eﬀects across diﬀer-
ent groups of youths. But there are considerable diﬀerences across youths
in their underlying propensity to smoke. Most noticeable are racial diﬀer-
ences, and the YRBS suggests some diﬀerences by parents’ education as
well, at least for younger teens. In this section, we explore the heterogene-
ity in the price responsiveness of young smokers. In particular, we assess
whether socioeconomically disadvantaged youths are more responsive to
prices, suggesting a cross-elasticity between price and income.
The results for a racial decomposition of smoking responsiveness are
presented in table 2.9. For the MTF sample, we can compare only white
and nonwhite youths since this is the only racial distinction available in
these restricted data. In the YRBS and Natality data, we can compare
white and black youths more speciﬁcally. When we have estimated models
for whites and all nonwhites in these other data sets, the results are similar
but more muted than those for whites and blacks.
The results for the MTF and YRBS data for high school seniors are
striking: there is much higher price responsiveness among blacks than
among whites. In the MTF, the price elasticity of participation for white
high school seniors is only 0.35 and is insigniﬁcant, and there is a posi-
tive coeﬃcient on conditional intensity. But for black high school seniors
the elasticity of participation is an enormous and statistically signiﬁcant
2.32, and there is a signiﬁcant elasticity of conditional intensity of 2.03
as well. In the YRBS, the results are even more extreme, with an elasticity
of 0.63 for white smoking participation and an unreasonable elasticity
of 9.3 for blacks; this implausibly large estimate likely reﬂects the eﬀect
of examining a small number of tax changes in only a subsample of the
data. In the Natality data, on the other hand, the results are reversed: the
price elasticity for whites is slightly larger than for the full sample, and
there is no price responsiveness of participation among blacks (although
there is a large negative eﬀect on conditional intensity).
For younger teens, there is a much less clear racial pattern. There are
no signiﬁcant elasticities for either whites or blacks in the MTF or YRBS
data. For the Natality data, the elasticities are once again signiﬁcant for
whites and wrong signed for blacks.
One explanation for this higher price sensitivity among black youths is
lower income. A number of articles have found price elasticities for adult
smokers that fall with income (e.g., Evans, Ringel, and Stech 1999). If the
same is true for teens, then the lower incomes of black high school seniors
may explain their increased responsiveness. Unfortunately, none of these






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.data sets contain information on income. But the YRBS data do have an
excellent proxy for permanent income: parents’ education.
In the ﬁnal panel of table 2.9, we therefore present results that divide
the YRBS sample into those whose mother and father are high school
dropouts or graduates and those whose mother and father have some col-
lege or are college graduates. There is a striking diﬀerence across these
groups for high school seniors: the elasticity of participation is 4.4 for
the low-education group and is only 0.2 for the high-education group
(and is highly insigniﬁcant for the latter). This is oﬀset to some extent by
a very large conditional-intensity elasticity for the high-education group.
But, overall, there is a clear negative correlation of price responsiveness
and socioeconomic status measured this way. Once again, however, there
is no clear relation for younger teens; the elasticity of participation is actu-
ally positive and signiﬁcant for younger teens with less-educated parents
and is positive and insigniﬁcant for younger teens with more highly edu-
cated parents.
Taken together, the results presented in table 2.9 suggest two important
conclusions. First, for high school seniors, there is a strong cross-elasticity
between price and income. Lower-income groups, whether measured ra-
cially or by parents’ education, are much more price sensitive. Moreover,
the fact that the results by race for teen mothers are reversed is consistent
with the fact that, while white teens are much more advantaged than black
teens as a whole, among teen mothers blacks actually have a higher median
income.9 Second, there continues to be evidence that the smoking decisions
of younger teens are determined primarily by noneconomic factors. Not
only are younger teens not price sensitive, but there is also no pattern of
increased relative sensitivity with income, as proxied by either race or par-
ents’ education.
2.4 Intertemporal Correlation in Youth Smoking
While the previous discussion has suggested that seniors are responsive
to the price of cigarettes, it does not resolve the more important question:
the long-run intertemporal implications of youth smoking. That is, what
does rising youth smoking today imply for the adult smoking rate in the
future? If shifts in youth smoking imply long-run increases in adult smok-
ing, then we are headed toward a substantial reversal in the downward
trend in smoking in the United States.
There are two extreme possibilities for thinking about the linkage be-
tween youth smoking and adult smoking. At one extreme, which we label
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9. Speciﬁcally, in 1997, median family income for white teens was $47,000, while it was
only $25,000 for black teens. At the same time, median income was $3,000 among white teen
mothers and $4,300 among black teen mothers.the public-health view, all that matters for adult smoking are youth-
smoking decisions. Since almost all smokers start as youths, if we could
end youth smoking, we would end adult smoking. At the other extreme,
which we label the delayed-initiation view, there is a ﬁxed predisposition to
experiment with cigarettes, and setting up barriers to youth smoking
simply delays the period of experimentation until after the teen years. Un-
der this view, reducing teen smoking has little eﬀect on long-run adult
smoking.
Some casual evidence on this issue is provided in table 2.10. This table
presents cross-tabulations of the odds of smoking at older ages against the
age of initiation, using data from the 1992 NHIS and the 1995 NHIS. We
ﬁnd that, as the public-health view would suggest, initiation at twelve to
fourteen is worse than initiation in later teen years in terms of the subse-
quent likelihood of smoking. On the other hand, initiation at twenty-one
to twenty-ﬁve appears to have similar implications for later smoking par-
ticipation, if not intensity, as does initiation at twelve to fourteen. This is
not simply an artifact of the feature of the data that, at any age past
twenty-ﬁve, ages twenty-one to twenty-ﬁve are closer than are ages twelve
to fourteen. As the age group used for this table ages, the relative relations
persist; indeed, for those age thirty-eight and older, the odds of smoking
participation are higher for those who started at ages twenty-one to
twenty-ﬁve than they are for those who started at ages twelve to fourteen.
Of course, this evidence does not provide deﬁnitive evidence for either
view described above since it may simply represent individual heterogene-
ity; the set of persons who begin smoking after age twenty may intend
more to continue smoking at later ages. But it is nevertheless suggestive of
the merit of the delayed-initiation view.
Table 2.10 Age of Initiation versus Current Smoking
Start at Start at Start at Start at
Age 12–14 Age 15–17 Age 18–20 Age 21–25
Those age 28:
Smoke now? .52 .49 .46 .52
Smoke every day? .45 .41 .36 .42
Cigarettes per day 19.6 18.1 15.8 16.7
Those age 33:
Smoke now? .49 .46 .43 .49
Smoke every day? .42 .38 .35 .40
Cigarettes per day 20.4 18.6 16.3 16.8
Those age 38:
Smoke now? .45 .43 .40 .46
Smoke every day? .40 .36 .33 .38
Cigarettes per day 21.2 19.1 16.8 17.4
Note: Authors’ tabulations of the 1992 NHIS and the 1995 NHIS. Each cell shows either the
proportion smoking or cigarettes per day for the group indicated in the column heads at the
age denoted for each panel.
108 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan ZinmanIn this section, we take two approaches to trying to assess more rigor-
ously the extent to which more youth smoking will translate into increased
adult smoking. The ﬁrst, and most direct, is to examine whether shifting
patterns of smoking across cohorts of youths are reﬂected in the smoking
rates of those cohorts as adults. This approach will yield an estimate of
the relation between rising youth smoking and rising adult smoking that
is free of individual heterogeneity bias; this is akin to using cohort dum-
mies as instruments. But, while we attempt several approaches below, this
method may not be able to disentangle general time-series eﬀects from
true cohort shifts in smoking propensities.
The second method is therefore to assess the implications for adult
smoking of diﬀerential taxes on youths. That is, if there are two adults who
face the same tax regime today but who faced diﬀerent tax regimes as
teens, by how much does their smoking diﬀer? This approach has the ad-
vantage that it best approximates the experiment of interest, which is exog-
enously to induce some groups of teens to smoke and others not to smoke.
But it has the disadvantage that one can infer the implications of our ﬁnd-
ings for the long-run implications of youth smoking only indirectly. To the
extent that this indirect inference yields results similar to those yielded by
the ﬁrst method, then these provide two reinforcing approaches to estimat-
ing this important intertemporal correlation.
The only paper of which we are aware that attempts to carry out an
exercise of this nature is Glied (1999), which examines the eﬀe c to fc i g a -
rette taxes in the state where the smoker was fourteen on later smoking,
using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and which
ﬁnds no eﬀect of youth taxes. But Glied’s relatively small sample does not
permit the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects for either state of birth or state of
residence; also, the standard errors on her estimates are too large to rule
out relatively sizable eﬀects of youth taxes on later smoking.
2.4.1 Intertemporal Correlation across Cohorts
We ﬁrst consider the extent of intertemporal correlation in smoking
across cohorts, in two ways. First, we use data on smoking by high school
seniors from the MTF data matched to the smoking of this same cohort
ten years later, as twenty-seven- to twenty-eight-year-olds, from the Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data, which provide an
annual survey of smoking rates for a large representative sample of the
U.S. population. We match data from the period 1976–87 on smoking of
high school seniors to data from 1986–97 on the smoking of this same co-
hort as twenty-seven-to twenty-eight-year-olds. We focus on young adults
because this maximizes the number of cohort comparisons that we can
make, given that the MTF data are not available before 1976.
The results of doing so are presented in the ﬁrst panel of table 2.11. We
ﬁrst show a simple bivariate regression of the smoking of twenty-seven-to
twenty-eight-year-olds on the smoking of this cohort as high school seniors
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 109ten years earlier. We ﬁnd a very strong correlation, with a coeﬃcient of
0.65. Of course, this ﬁnding may reﬂect simple secular trends in the data;
if smoking is declining over time, even in the absence of any within-cohort
correlation one will ﬁnd that cohorts born later smoke less both as teens
and as adults. We attempt to control for this in two ways in table 2.11.
First, we include a linear time trend. This time trend is marginally signiﬁ-
cant, indicating a secular decline in smoking of 0.3 percentage points per
year for this population over our twelve-year sample, and the coeﬃcient
on the lagged youth-smoking rate falls to 0.4. Second, we include the
smoking rate in each year of forty-two to forty-three-year-olds as a proxy
for trends in adult smoking that should not be determined by the smoking
of high school seniors ten years earlier. This additional control is insigniﬁ-
cant, and, when it is included with the time trend, the coeﬃcient on lagged
youth smoking actually rises to 0.5.
The disadvantage of this approach is its relatively narrow historical cov-
erage. We therefore next turn to data from the NHIS, which in several
years (1978, 1979, 1980, 1987, and 1988) asked current and former smokers
the age at which they began smoking (as well as when they quit if they are
former smokers). This allows us to calculate by cohort, not only their cur-
Table 2.11 Intertemporal Correlations across Cohorts in Smoking Behavior
Smoking Time Trends
No Time among 42–43- & 42–43
Controls Trends Year-Olds Smoking
BRFSS 27–28-year-olds
(N  12, 1986–97):
MTF high school .648 .397 .781 .500
senior smoking rate (.088) (.157) (.273) (.298)
in year t  10
Time trend .0030 .0029
(.0016) (.0017)
42–43-year-old .202 .148
smoking rate (.389) (.354)
NHIS 27–28-year-olds
(N  36, 1950–95):
NHIS 17–18 smoking .673 1.185 .067 .350
rate in year t  10 (.482) (.131) (.179) (.127)
Time trend .0058 .0044
(.0002) (.0007)
42–43-year-old 1.082 .485
smoking rate (.056) (.100)
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Regressions in the ﬁrst panel match data
from the BRFSS on 27–28-year-olds and 42–43-year-old controls for 1986–97 to correspond-
ing MTF data from 10 years earlier; second panel matches backcast data from the NHIS for
27–28- and 42–43-year-olds to data from 10 years earlier on 17–18-year-olds. First column
is just bivariate regression of 27–28-year-old smoking rates on 17–18-year-old smoking rates;
second column includes linear time trend; third column includes contemporaneous smoking
rate of 42–43-year-olds; and ﬁnal column includes both time trends and 42–43-year-olds.
110 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan Zinmanrent smoking rate in the survey year, but their smoking rate when they
were high school seniors (ages seventeen to eighteen) as well as when they
were twenty-seven to twenty-eight and forty-two to forty-three.10 We can
then draw comparisons between the smoking rate of high school seniors
and the smoking rate of those same youths as they age, but over a much
larger historical range. We restrict the data to those persons age sixty and
younger to minimize any bias to this exercise through the diﬀerential mor-
tality of smokers. As a result, the earliest cohort comprises those who were
sixty in 1978, or high school seniors in 1936 and forty-two- to forty-three-
year-olds (our “control” group) in 1960. Data are available on adult smok-
ing from these look-back surveys through 1988 and then from cross-
sectional NHIS data sets through 1995. Thus, we can model the smoking
of twenty-seven- to twenty-eight-year-olds on their smoking rates as seven-
teen- to eighteen-year-olds, and include forty-two- to forty-three-year-olds
as a control, from 1960 through 1995 (thirty-six observations).
The results of doing so are shown in the next panel of table 2.11. Once
again, when one simply examines the correspondence between the smoking
ofthesecohortsasyouthsandtheirsmokingasyoungadults,thecorrelation
is quite strong, with a coeﬃcient that is very similar to the ﬁrst column of
the top panel. But, once again, when we control for time trends, the coeﬃ-
cient falls, and here it falls farther when we control as well for the smoking
of forty-two- to forty-three-year-olds (to capture general trends in taste for
smoking). The ﬁnal column reveals an intertemporal correlation of 0.35, a
time trend of 0.44 percentage points per year over this period, and very
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the smoking of older adults.
Thus, the ﬁndings from this ﬁrst exercise suggest that higher smoking
rates among youths translate in a signiﬁcant way to the smoking rates
of adults. The ﬁnal estimates are similar across these data sets, suggesting
an intertemporal correlation of 0.35 to 0.5. On the other hand, the fact that
thisestimateissigniﬁcantlysmallerthan1,evenobservingcohortstenyears
later, suggests that the pure public-health view is not appropriate; there
is more to reducing adult smoking than simply stopping youths from
smoking.
2.4.2 Youth Taxes and Adult Smoking
The advantage of the cohort approach is that it yields relatively straight-
forward estimates of the intertemporal correlation across cohorts. The dis-
advantage is that it does not deﬁnitively prove that there is an important
10. For most years, we can backcast from more than one NHIS (e.g., for the cohort that
was seventeen years old in 1940, we can use those who were ﬁfty-ﬁve in 1978, ﬁfty-six in
1979, and ﬁfty-seven in 1980); in those cases, we average the smoking rates for each cohort
that we obtain from the various years of the NHIS to reduce measurement error in the
backcasted smoking rates. The NHIS also asks about age of initiation in 1992 and 1995 but
not about age of quitting for former smokers, so this backcasting exercise is not possible in
those years.
Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence and Implications 111intertemporal correlation since there may be underlying time-series trends
that cannot be captured by our controls. We therefore attempt the second
approach laid out above, examining the eﬀect of taxes on youths on their
smoking as adults. Once again, the motivation is to use variation in taxes
that individuals faced as youths, conditional on the tax environment in
which they currently live, to provide exogenous variation in youth smoking
for the purposes of assessing intertemporal correlations. There is signiﬁ-
cant variation in youth taxes, conditional on current taxes, even for non-
movers, owing to changes in state tax policy over time.
We use the Natality data used earlier—which, in addition to other
strengths, also have information on the state of birth of these mothers—
to assess the eﬀect of the tax rate that teens faced on their smoking as
adults. The regressor of interest here is the average tax rate in the teens’
state of birth during the years when they were fourteen to seventeen years
old. Of course, state of birth is not the ideal measure for this exercise since
some individuals move between birth and the teen years. However, in the
1990 census, 74 percent of thirteen- to seventeen-year-olds lived in their
state of birth, so this is a reasonable proxy for state of residence as a teen.
Moreover, we (crudely) correct the estimates for mobility by using infor-
mation on state of birth and state of residence. If the mother’s state of
birth is the same as her current state of residence, we assume that she was
in that state as a teen. If not, we assume that she moved only from the
state of birth to the state of residence (making no other moves) and assign
her a weighted average of the tax rates in the two states when she was a
teen. These weights come from tabulations from the NLSY, which was
used to compute, for movers of a given age, at what age they moved; this
provides a means of averaging the state of birth and the state of residence
to reﬂect, given current age, the odds of moving before age fourteen.11 In
practice, this correction has little eﬀect on the estimates; for the most reli-
able estimates, we will use nonmovers only to mitigate this measurement-
error concern. We focus on women age twenty-four and older to allow for
as u ﬃcient lag to separate current and teen tax rates.
Since estimating this model on the 15 million observations in the micro
data is impractical, we ﬁrst convert the eight years of Natality data into a
set of year of birth  year of survey  state of birth  state of residence
cells. We then use the means of smoking rates in these cells to estimate
models of smoking today on the tax rates in both the current state of resi-
dence and the state of birth, including ﬁxed eﬀects for each of these sets
of states (residence and birth), for year of birth, for year of the survey,
and for age. We also control for the racial composition of the cell and
the share of the cell that are high school dropouts, are high school grad-
11. We are grateful to Phil Levine for providing us with these estimates from the NLSY.
112 Jonathan Gruber and Jonathan Zinmanuates, or have at least some college. All regressions are weighted by the
cell counts.
The primary dependent variable is the average number of cigarettes
smoked by women giving birth in the cell, incorporating zeros. We then
decompose this eﬀect into the eﬀect on smoking participation and the
eﬀect on conditional smoking intensity. On average in the sample (as is
shown in the bottom row of the regression in table 2.12), women who give
birth smoke roughly 1.95 cigarettes per day. This consists of a participation
rate of 15.8 percent and conditional cigarette consumption among those
who do smoke of 12.85. These smoking rates can be compared to the full
population of twenty-four- to forty-ﬁve-year-old females over this period,
where smoking rates were 26 percent and conditional cigarettes per day
were seventeen,12 women giving birth smoke less than the typical adult,
but smoking is still distressingly common in this population.
Table 2.12 shows the results that include both the contemporaneous tax
and the teen tax along with the control variables described above. For total
cigarettes smoked, we ﬁnd an elasticity of 0.46.13 This is almost identical
to the overall elasticity of cigarettes smoked for adults estimated in either
aggregate data (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1994) or micro data (Ev-
ans, Ringel, and Stech 1999). This eﬀect is then decomposed into a large
negative eﬀect on participation, with an elasticity of 0.6, and a small
positive eﬀect on conditional intensity. As discussed earlier, this wrong-
signed eﬀect may be the result of sample selection into who remains a
smoker as the tax changes. But the elasticity here is small in any case.
There is also a strong negative eﬀect of the tax as a teen. The overall
elasticity is 0.19, which is over 40 percent as large as the eﬀect of current
taxes. This arises from a participation elasticity of 0.06 and a negative
conditional-intensity elasticity.
One problem noted above is that the tax rate is assigned with some error
since we know only birthplace and not the state of residence as a teen. To
mitigate this measurement error, in the second set of columns in table 2.12
we use only the sample of nonmovers, for whom we can presume that the
state of both birth and current residence is the state in which the mother
resided as a teen. For this sample, the eﬀect of both current taxes and
taxes as a teen is somewhat larger, and the eﬀect of youth taxes is some-
what larger, with the result that the overall elasticity with respect to youth
taxes is 0.22 and the participation elasticity 0.078.
These ﬁndings clearly provide evidence for the addictive nature of smok-
ing: if one exogenously shifts women early in life to nonsmoking status
with higher taxes, they will smoke less later in life as a result. But their
12. Authors’ tabulations from the 1989–97 BRFSS data.
13. Even though we are using tax rates as the regressor here, we show price elasticities,
assuming one for one pass-through of taxes to prices.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.magnitudes are diﬃcult to interpret in a vacuum. To do so, we can com-
pare the elasticity of adult smoking with respect to youth taxes to the
earlier estimates of the elasticity of youth smoking with respect to youth
taxes. Such a comparison is not fully direct since these women were youths
during the period 1957–85 and our estimates pertain to the 1990s, but
these youth elasticities nevertheless provide a sensible benchmark. In the
MTF data, over all youths (since this exercise compares average youth
taxes to adult smoking), the elasticity of smoking participation with re-
s p e c tt op r i c ei s0.31. We ﬁnd here that the elasticity of participation as
an adult with respect to youth taxes is 0.078, or 25 percent as large. Thus,
these results imply that there is an intertemporal correlation coeﬃcient of
0.25.
Thus, we conclude that there is evidence for both hypotheses about the
potential eﬀect of youth smoking. Youth smoking is clearly an important
determinant of adult smoking, with an intertemporal correlation of from
0.25 to 0.5, and our second piece of evidence suggests in particular
that the taxes that youths face clearly have an important eﬀect on the
decision to smoke many years later. But youth smoking is by no means the
sole, or even the primary, determinant of smoking later in life; indeed,
the taxes that smokers face as adults are signiﬁcantly more important than
the taxes that they faced as youths.
2.5 Conclusions
The 1990s is a decade that has produced a very mixed track record with
respect to risky behaviors among youths. While teen births and crime rates
are steeply down (Levine, chap. 4 in this volume; Levitt and Lochner, chap.
7 in this volume), we have shown here that rates of substance use, and
particularly smoking rates, are rising. The increase in smoking rates is par-
ticularly vexing given the expected, widely postulated intertemporal corre-
lation between the decisions of youths to smoke and their subsequent
smoking as adults, with the corresponding costly eﬀects on health.
We have attempted to investigate several aspects of the youth-smoking
question in this paper in an eﬀort to advance our understanding of what
drives these important decisions. We report four ﬁndings of interest. First,
smoking participation is not simply concentrated among the most disad-
vantaged youths; indeed, increasingly over time, youth smoking is taking
place among white, suburban youths with college-educated parents and
good grades. Second, we show that neither changes in demographic char-
acteristics nor changes in attitudes toward smoking can explain the strik-
ing increase in smoking rates in the 1990s.
Third, we ﬁnd that the single greatest policy determinant of youth smok-
ing is the price of cigarettes. We consistently estimate across several data
sets that older teens are very sensitive to the price of cigarettes, with a
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sharp reduction in cigarette prices in the early 1990s can explain roughly
26 percent of the increase in smoking over the subsequent six years. More-
over, this price sensitivity rises for more socioeconomically disadvantaged
groups such as blacks or those with less-educated parents.
At the same time, we ﬁnd that younger teens are not sensitive to prices
on average, nor is there any relation between price sensitivity and socio-
economic status for younger teens. These ﬁndings suggest important het-
erogeneity in the teen population. Younger teens appear to be price-
insensitive experimenters who evolve into more price-sensitive smokers by
their older teen years. An important priority for future work in this area
is to understand the evolution of smoking between the younger and the
older teenage years.
These ﬁndings also hold out little hope for other policies as a means of
reducing youth smoking. We do ﬁnd some evidence that policies that re-
strict youth access to cigarettes reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked
by the youths so aﬀected, but this ﬁnding is not nearly as robust as the
price relation. There is no consistent evidence that restrictions on smoking
in public places decrease smoking.
Finally, the results imply that this rise in youth smoking will have impor-
tant implications for the long-run stock of smokers in the United States.
Evidence from two diﬀerent approaches, examining the intertemporal cor-
relation across cohorts and modeling the eﬀect of youth taxes on adult
smoking, suggests that between 25 and 50 percent of the rise in youth
smoking will persist into adulthood. Over this period, smoking rose by 8
percentage points for high school seniors in the MTF survey. This implies
a long-run rise in the adult-smoking rate of 2–4 percentage points. Com-
pared to the current adult-smoking rate of 25 percent, this is a rise of
8–16 percent, a nontrivial increase. Of course, whether this recent rise will
persist into adulthood in the manner suggested by past cohort shifts is
unclear. The technology for quitting smoking has improved dramatically
in recent years, and these youths are moving into workplaces that almost
universally ban smoking, raising signiﬁcantly the hassle costs of main-
taining a habit. But the historical record speaks clearly, which should indi-
cate a very signiﬁcant rise in adult smoking going forward.
On the other hand, the recent decline in youth smoking in the face of
modest price increases suggests that this may cause, not a permanent up-
ward shift in adult smoking, but perhaps a “bulge” in smoking rates across
cohorts. The prices of cigarettes rose by roughly 30 percent over the course
of 1999, as a result of a shifting forward by tobacco manufacturers of the
costs of settling their state lawsuits. Using the estimates presented here,
this price rise should cause a 20 percent decline in youth smoking, which
would almost fully undo the rise from 1991 to 1997.
Even if the rise from 1991 to 1997 was a transitory one, however, the
long-run health consequences could be substantial. A 2–4 percentage
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reduced increase for the 1998 cohort of high school seniors (as prices be-
gan to rise), implies 477,000–954,000 more adult smokers. Of course, some
of these adults will then quit in their adult years, and those who quit
suﬃciently before the age of greatest medical risk from smoking (age sixty
on) can substantially reduce their mortality risk. On the basis of the NHIS
data for 1987–88 on age of initiation and age of quitting, we can estimate
that, of those who started smoking as youths and are still smoking at age
thirty-ﬁve, 45 percent will quit by age sixty. So a conservative estimate is
that 263,000–525,000 additional persons will have their lives shortened
owing to increased smoking.
As noted above, smoking throughout one’s life shortens life expectancy
by 6.5 years for men and 5.7 years for women. Taking a simple average
across men and women, this implies that the rise in youth smoking will
cause a reduction of 1.6–3.2 million life years, even if this rise is totally
undone. At a value of $100,000 per life year (Cutler and Richardson 1997),
and discounted at a real 3 percent rate from age sixty-nine (typical life
expectancy for smokers) to age nineteen, this is a forgone value of life years
in today’s dollars of $36–$73 billion. Once again, this is a vast oversimpli-
ﬁcation as both quitting technologies and the mortality eﬀects of smoking
are evolving rapidly over time. But it suggests the importance of even a
potentially transitory rise in youth smoking for the health of the U.S. popu-
lation.
Overall, these results imply that policy makers should be concerned
about rising youth smoking; even if there is not a one-for-one translation
into higher adult-smoking rates, the health implications can be enormous.
And this concern should lead policy makers to consider cigarette taxes as
the most eﬀective means of reducing youth smoking. Of course, with
youths smoking only about 2 percent of cigarette packs, taxes are a very
blunt instrument with which to address youth-smoking issues. Thus, there
are a host of additional issues that must be considered in deriving the
optimal cigarette tax beyond considerations of youth smoking; Chaloupka
and Warner (in press), Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999), and Gruber and
Koszegi (2000) provide further discussions of these factors. But the results
presented here suggest that consideration of optimal cigarette-tax policy
must include the very strong eﬀect that taxes have on teen smoking.
Appendix
Youth-Access Index
Our Youth-Access Index (YAI) is based on the National Cancer Institute’s
(NCI) decision criteria for rating state youth-access laws. The NCI’s crite-
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intervention; photo identiﬁcation; vending-machine availability; free dis-
tribution; graduated penalties; random inspections; and statewide enforce-
ment. For each category, a score is granted on a scale of 1–4 or 1–5 as a
function of the stringency of state regulation in that area. For example,
states get a score of 0 if the minimum age is younger than eighteen; a
score of 3 if the minimum age is eighteen but there is no requirement of
signposting and/or there is no speciﬁc penalty for failure to post a sign; a
score of 4 if the minimum age is eighteen with speciﬁc signposting require-
ments and penalties for failure to post; and a score of 5 if there is a mini-
mum age older than eighteen and there are posting/penalty provisions.
These scores are then summed across categories to get a total access index
score. Then states’ points are reduced by two points (to a minimum score
of 0) if they allow their state regulation to preempt a stricter local ordi-
nance.
While the general framework of the two indexes is the same, the YAI
contains several variations in order to describe state tobacco laws in more
detail. The largest diﬀerence is the inclusion of three categories in addition
to the nine utilized by the NCI—advertising, licensing, and restrictions on
minors. Points are awarded for advertising restrictions on a scale between 1
and 4. A state earns a score of 1 for minimal limitations (no advertising on
school buses etc.) and a score of 4 for a ban on all tobacco advertisements.
Including licensing in the YAI captures the extent to which retailers, ven-
dors, and wholesalers are regulated by state agencies. Maximum licensing
requirements (applicable to retailers, vendors, and wholesalers) received a
score of 4, while states mandating only wholesale licenses received a score
of 1. The restrictions-on-minors category encompasses laws relating to the
underage purchase, possession, and use of tobacco. Those states outlawing
these actions but implementing no penalties for violating the laws received
a score between 0 and 1. The highest possible score, 4, is given to states out-
lawing the purchase, possession, and use and implementation of gradu-
ated penalties.
The YAI also allows for more point levels under each category than does
the NCI index to create a ﬁner gradation between the stringency of various
laws. For example, one problem with the minimum-age categorization
noted above is that some states mandate signage at the point of purchase
while others mandate signage but not at the point of purchase; we awarded
the latter group of states a score of 3.5 instead of 4. This aﬀected twenty-
one states overall. Similar half-point steps were added to the scoring of
each of the nine original NCI categories. The purpose of this variation
from the NCI index was to distinguish more clearly between the stringency
of varying state requirements.
In several instances we also altered scoring decisions made by the NCI
in the ﬁnal computation of state scores. After extensive investigation of
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12th Graders 8th & 10th Graders 8th–12th Graders
Access index 11.91 11.69 11.76
(5.29) (5.46) (5.41)
Clean air:
Private workplace .44 .44 .44
(.50) (.50) (.50)
Government workplace .73 .71 .72
(.44) (.45) (.45)
Restaurants .64 .61 .62
(.48) (.49) (.49)
Schools .90 .85 .87
(.30) (.36) (.34)
Other .93 .91 .92
(.25) (.29) (.28)
No. of observations 106,539 230,126 336,665
Note: From authors’ tabulations of 1991–97 MTF restricted sample data described in the
text. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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